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THE CHANGING FACE OF MONEY 
 
CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 It is a truism that each generation views money differently. 
Parents of baby boomers, having lived through the Great Depression, 
are understandably said to be savers. Boomers themselves, on the 
other hand, while “arguably the most prosperous generation in 
American history,” have tended to short-change saving for 
retirement—though often to assist their adult children, “from paying 
their college loans and allowing them to move home and live rent 
free, to paying off their credit card debt and making mortgage 
payments for them.”1 Tellingly, the U.S. personal savings rate 
plummeted from 10.1 percent in 1970 to 0.8 percent in 2005, while 
the household financial obligations ratio rose from 13.4 percent in 
1980 to 17.6 percent in 2007.2 Consumer spending, meanwhile, “has 
become the largest component of U.S. gross domestic product,” 
representing over two-thirds of U.S. economic activity.3 
                                                 
* Associate Professor and Ethan Allen Faculty Fellow, Washington and Lee 
University School of Law. A.B., University of Michigan; M. Phil., Univer-
sity of Oxford; J.D., Harvard Law School. For generous financial support, I 
am grateful to the Frances Lewis Law Center at Washington and Lee 
University School of Law. Many thanks to Adam Scales and Robert 
Vandersluis for helpful comments and suggestions, and to my parents for 
Grand-dad’s silver certificates.  
1 Ameriprise Financial, The Ameriprise Financial Money Across Genera-
tions Study, Sept. 2007, at 3, 7, 9. 
2 See Harold James, The Enduring International Preeminence of the Dollar, 
in THE FUTURE OF THE DOLLAR 24, 36 (Eric Helleiner & Jonathan Kirshner 
eds., 2009); Federal Reserve Board, Household Debt Service and Financial 
Obligations Ratios, http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/ housedebt/. 
The household financial obligations ratio represents the ratio of various 
estimated payments (i.e. mortgages, consumer debt, automobile leases, 
rental payments on tenant-occupied property, homeowners’ insurance, and 
property taxes) to disposable personal income.  Id. 
3 Elaine L. Chao & Kathleen P. Utgoff, 100 Years of U.S. Consumer 
Spending: Data for the Nation, New York City, and Boston, Rep. 991 Dep’t 
of Labor (May 2006). See also Stephanie Rosenbloom, Upbeat Signs Revive 
Consumers’ Mood for Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2010/04/07/business/07shop.html.  
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 In this light, perhaps there is some justice in the refrain that 
kids these days don’t know the value of a dollar. To be fair, however, 
the dollar itself is a moving target. For example, silver certificates 
from my grandfather’s collection suggest that the value of the U.S. 
dollar may have been a more straightforward matter back in the day. 
One such certificate, series 1957A, forthrightly states: “This certifies 
that there is on deposit in the Treasury of the United States of 
America one dollar in silver payable to the bearer on demand.” A 
dollar bill plucked from my billfold, though aesthetically similar, 
provides no such certification. Cryptically labeled “Federal Reserve 
Note,” my series 2006 dollar offers no explanation of its value, 
simply declaring its adequacy as “legal tender for all debts, public 
and private.”   
 As I write this essay, the dollar’s adequacy is a matter of 
considerable debate. In the wake of a catastrophic financial and 
economic crisis, there is strong visceral appeal to the notion that one 
could hand in paper currency and demand a tangible lump of 
precious metal in return.4 Amidst reports of a potential downgrade of 
U.S. sovereign debt;5 volatility in credit default swaps on U.S. 
Treasury securities (a form of quasi-insurance against default);6 
                                                 
4 Cf. Colin Barr, Dollar takes another drubbing, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 6, 
2010, http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2010/10/06/dollar-takes-another-
drubbing/ (linking the rising price of gold to the expectation of increases in 
the money supply); Carolyn Cui, Gold Vaults to New High, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 29, 2010, at A1-A2 (linking gold’s rise to concern that “if the Federal 
Reserve pumps more money into the system, its efforts might hurt the value 
of the U.S. dollar and possibly stoke inflation”); Liam Hallingan, Policy 
makers must do more than print money and hope for the best, THE 
TELEGRAPH, Sept. 25, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ 
liamhalligan/8025121/Policy-makers-must-do-more-than-print-money-and-
hope-for-the-best.html (“[I]t’s no surprise that many investors are now 
taking refuge in tangible assets, anything that Western governments can’t 
debase by printing more of.”). 
5 See, e.g., Joanna Slater, Moody’s Puts U.S., U.K. on Chopping Block, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2009, at C2. 
6 See, e.g., Katy Burne, Cost to Insure US Govt Debt 30% Higher Since 
August—Fitch, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
BT-CO-20101015-707783.html. See also Stephen Bainbridge, What, Me 
Worry? Credit Default Swaps on US Treasuries, http://www.professor 
bainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/02/what-me-worry-credit-
default-swaps-on-us-treasuries.html (Feb. 20, 2010, 23:01 EST) (noting that 
“the price of credit default swaps on US treasuries has been rising lately”). 
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clamoring by dollar-saturated foreign governments to reduce global 
reliance on the greenback in international trade and finance;7 and 
concerns regarding the efficacy and consequences of the Federal 
Reserve’s expansion of the money supply following the crisis,8 there 
is growing anxiety at home and abroad that our monetary foundation 
may be eroding. 
 Such headlines raise important questions about how we 
finance our lives—both individually and collectively. What would it 
mean to reduce global reliance on the dollar? What alternatives exist, 
and how might they affect the United States? What is the value of a 
dollar in the first place? How might the dollar’s value change in the 
wake of the crisis? 
 In this essay I argue that widespread failure to comprehend 
the intrinsic nature of modern money loomed large in the recent 
crisis, and that broader comprehension of its meaning is a 
precondition for effective post-crisis reforms. First, I provide a brief 
history of money, emphasizing its gradual divergence from inherent 
value. I then consider the value of today’s dollar in economic, legal 
and psychological terms, arguing that each perspective conveys a 
single over-arching lesson—that better comprehending our money 
requires better comprehending ourselves. The introspection that this 
exercise demands reveals with unique clarity some of the critical 
lessons of the crisis and its aftermath. 
 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Andrew Batson, China Takes Aim at Dollar, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
24, 2009, at A1 (“China called for the creation of a new currency to even-
tually replace the dollar as the world’s standard, proposing a sweeping 
overhaul of global finance that reflects developing nations’ growing unhap-
piness with the U.S. role in the world economy.”); Robert Fisk, The demise 
of the dollar, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 6, 2009, http://www. 
independent.co.uk/news/business/news/the-demise-of-the-dollar-1798175. 
html (reporting that “Gulf Arabs are planning—along with China, Russia, 
Japan and France—to end dollar dealings for oil”); John Ydstie, Dollar 
Loses Its Luster As Reserve Currency, NPR, Oct. 9, 2009, http://www.npr. 
org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=113650226 (reporting that “there’s 
been renewed talk in some quarters of finding an alternative for the dollar as 
the world’s major reserve currency—and, also, pricing oil in something 
other than dollars”). 
8 See supra note 4. 
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II. A Brief History of Money 
 
 Money evolved as a means of facilitating transactions in 
goods and services. Adam Smith, having outlined the benefits of a 
division of labor in Book I of The Wealth of Nations, speculates that 
exchanging one’s surplus for that of another in earlier times “must 
frequently have been very much clogged and embarrassed in its 
operations”—because in a barter economy, value-enhancing 
exchanges occur only when each party requires precisely what the 
other offers.9 This, concludes Smith, must have led “every prudent 
man in every period of society” to seek to have on hand “a certain 
quantity of some one commodity or other, such as he imagined few 
people would be likely to refuse in exchange for the produce of their 
industry.”10 
 A widely valued commodity, as Smith suggests, can perform 
the core functions that economists ascribe to money. Niall Ferguson 
explains that in addition to providing “a medium of exchange” 
avoiding the “inefficiencies of barter,” money serves as “a unit of 
account, which facilitates valuation and calculation,” as well as “a 
store of value, which allows economic transactions to be conducted 
over long periods as well as geographical distances.”11 While any 
number of resources might serve as a medium of exchange, a unit of 
account and a store of value, there has long been a strong attraction 
to metals. Ferguson observes that the ideal commodity must be 
“available, affordable, durable, fungible, portable and reliable,” and 
that metals like gold and silver “were for millennia regarded as the 
ideal monetary raw material” precisely because they possess this 
suite of practical attributes.12 
 Due to the widespread use of gold and silver coins through 
the ages, and their resulting popular association with wealth, there 
has long been a colloquial tendency to speak of money and such 
                                                 
9 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS ¶ I.4.2  (W.B. Todd ed., OUP 1997) (1776). 
10 Id. 
11 NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY 24 (Penguin Books 2009). See 
also Eric Helleiner & Jonathan Kirshner, The Future of the Dollar: Whither 
the Key Currency?, in THE FUTURE OF THE DOLLAR, supra note 2, at 1, 3-4. 
12 FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 24-25. See also Ali Khan, The Evolution of 
Money: A Story of Constitutional Nullification, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 393, 402 
(1999) (suggesting that the limited supply of gold and silver facilitated 
market stability). 
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metals as if they possessed some fixed, intrinsic worth. That money 
itself is subject to the same law of supply and demand as any 
commodity, however, is a lesson that nations have learned the hard 
way. Smith, for example, recounts that Spain’s “discovery of the 
abundant mines of America reduced, in the sixteenth century, the 
value of gold and silver in Europe to about a third of what it had been 
before”—the straightforward consequence being that “when they 
were brought thither they could purchase or command less labour.”13 
Quantifying value at a point in time is of course critical to money’s 
economic utility, rendering it, in Smith’s words, “the great wheel of 
circulation.”14 As Smith rightly observes, however, value “does not 
so properly consist in the piece of gold, as in what [one] can get for 
it”—that is, its purchasing power, which inevitably varies over 
time.15 
 Money, then, has always been at most a proxy for real value. 
Over the course of centuries, however, creative financial innovations 
have progressively taken the concept to further heights of abstraction, 
gradually substituting for metals the paper bills we take for granted 
today. While gold reigned supreme as the “traditional standard of 
value” from the earliest use of coins (about 700 B.C.), paper money 
evolved alongside it, eventually displacing it over the last century.16 
 Thought to have originated in third-century B.C. China, 
accounts of paper money first reached Europe through Marco Polo’s 
account of Kublai Khan’s money in the late-thirteenth century A.D.17 
Explaining that “the Great Khan” had “mastered the art of alchemy,” 
Polo describes the production of paper money from the bark of 
mulberry trees—appropriately enough, the food source for that 
engine of ancient commerce, the silk worm.18 Kublai Khan’s paper 
money exemplifies what economists today call “fiat money”—
money not linked to any commodity, but simply declared by a 
sovereign to constitute legal currency.19 While the value of modern 
fiat money is substantially a function of market perception (explored 
                                                 
13 SMITH, supra note 9, ¶ I.5.7. 
14 Id. ¶ II.2.23. 
15 Id. ¶ II.2.19. 
16 See MARY ELLEN SNODGRASS, COINS AND CURRENCY 187 (2003). 
17 See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 222 (2000); A. 
HINGSTON QUIGGIN, A SURVEY OF PRIMITIVE MONEY 248 (1949); 
SNODGRASS, supra note 16, at 317. 
18 MARCO POLO, THE TRAVELS 147 (Ronald Latham trans., Penguin 1982). 
19 See SNODGRASS, supra note 16, at 163. 
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below), Kublai Khan took a far more direct approach, simply 
decreeing that anyone within his kingdom refusing to accept this 
money would be executed (as would forgers). Polo assures the reader 
that “all peoples and populations who are subject to this rule are 
perfectly willing to accept these papers in payment.”20 
  While Europeans would ultimately adopt paper money as 
well, it would emerge first in the marketplace, and its rise would 
accompany that of modern banking systems and debt markets. 
Negotiable “bills of exchange” arose during the Middle Ages to 
facilitate trade among merchants, permitting those selling on credit to 
“either use the bill as a means of payment in its own right or obtain 
cash for it at a discount from a banker willing to act as broker”—the 
core business of the Medici in fifteenth-century Florence.21 Northern 
European commercial centers built on their model, developing 
systems permitting direct debit-based payments (the Amsterdam 
Wisselbank); “fractional reserve banking,” allowing depositors’ 
money to be lent to borrowers, with only some small fraction 
retained to satisfy withdrawals (the Stockholms Banco); and finally 
banknotes, the issuance of which was eventually monopolized by a 
single state-recognized entity (the Bank of England).22 
 In Europe the value of this new form of currency long 
remained linked to metals. As Smith describes it, eighteenth-century 
paper money effectively represented an efficiency-enhancing stand-
in for metals, deriving value from the public’s faith in its 
exchangeability for gold and silver. “When the people of any 
particular country have such confidence in the fortune, probity and 
prudence” of the issuing bank, “those notes come to have the same 
currency as gold and silver money.”23 Smith accordingly suggests 
that “judicious operations of banking, by substituting paper in the 
room of a great part of this gold and silver,” permit more of a 
nation’s capital to be put to productive use at any given time, because 
the gold and silver itself need not be bound up in the form of 
                                                 
20 See POLO, supra note 18, at 147-48. 
21 FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 43-45. 
22 Id. at 49-50. Fractional reserve banking, in particular, creates a multiplier 
effect, increasing the money supply as successive banks effectively lend and 
re-lend the same money, in each case retaining only a small portion as 
reserves. Id. at 51-52. 
23 SMITH, supra note 9, ¶ II.2.28. 
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circulating money—just as a “waggon-way through the air” would 
permit a greater portion of the nation’s land to be tilled.24 
 Notes of the Bank of England were made legal tender in 
1718 when the institution became a “Royal Bank,”25 but imbuing 
paper money with the status of legal tender was long approached 
with great suspicion in the United States.26 Indeed, the gradual shift 
toward paper money in the United States over the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries was largely crisis-driven and, at each step, 
legally controversial. While the U.S. Constitution gives Congress 
express authority “[t]o coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, . . . 
and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures,”27 its authority to 
create paper money was left entirely unclear by the framers.28 The 
efficiency benefits of banknotes were well understood, and in fact 
bearer notes convertible into gold or silver issued by state-chartered 
banks became “the functional money of the United States” in the 
early nineteenth century, constituting “the bulk of the money supply” 
by the 1860s.29 The federal government itself, however, would turn 
to paper money only episodically, to finance war efforts in the face 
of dwindling gold and silver reserves—notably in the War of 1812, 
and then more concertedly in the Civil War.30 
 United States notes were initially issued in 1862,31 and the 
constitutionality of making them legal tender for private debts—
particularly in peacetime—was a hotly contested matter that would 
not be definitively resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court until 1884.32 
Notwithstanding the lack of express constitutional authority for 
Congress to create a national paper currency, the Court nevertheless 
                                                 
24 Id. ¶ II.2.86. 
25 See Khan, supra note 12, at 412-13, n.95. 
26 See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to Congressional 
Power: Revisiting the Legal Tender Cases, 95 GEO. L.J. 119, 134 (2006) 
(“Paper money was greeted with great hostility by constitutional lawyers 
until the 1860s.”). 
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
28 See, e.g., Khan, supra note 12, at 404-407.  
29 See id. at 408-17, 430. 
30 See id. at 421-26; Magliocca, supra note 26, at 134-37.  
31 See U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Legal Tender Status, https://ustreas.gov/ 
education/faq/currency/legal-tender.shtml.  United States Notes remain legal 
tender, but because they “serve no function that is not already adequately 
served by Federal Reserve Notes, their issuance was discontinued, and none 
have been placed in to [sic] circulation since January 21, 1971.” Id. 
32 See Magliocca, supra note 26, at 120-24. 
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concluded in Juilliard v. Greenman that Congress possesses such 
power “as incident to the power of borrowing money, and issuing 
bills or notes of the government for money borrowed”—a conclusion 
“fortified” by Congress’ express authority to coin money and to 
regulate foreign and interstate commerce.33 
 In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Field argued that the 
power to coin money included nothing beyond “mould[ing] metallic 
substances” into coins suitable for circulation, while the power to 
borrow money included nothing more than authority for the 
government itself “to contract for a loan of money.”34 This latter 
power, he emphasized, “is a very different one from a power to deal 
between parties to private contracts in which the government is not 
interested, and to compel the receipt of these promises to pay in place 
of the money for which the contracts stipulated.”35 Field went 
further, however, arguing that paper could not conceivably replace 
metals as “a standard of value” because it lacks the practical intrinsic 
attributes of metals, which “are not dependent upon legislation” and 
“cannot be manufactured or decreed into existence.”36 He ominously 
concluded that “only evil [was] likely to follow” from the Court’s 
holding, in matters of fiscal and monetary policy, given the “inborn 
infirmity” of paper money.37 “If Congress has the power to make the 
notes a legal tender and to pass as money or its equivalent,” he asked, 
then “why should not a sufficient amount be issued to pay the bonds 
of the United States as they mature?”38 Likewise, “why should there 
be any restraint upon unlimited appropriations . . . if the printing 
press can furnish the money that is needed for them?”39 
 Cases challenging the legitimacy of paper money would long 
continue to arise. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Juilliard v. 
Greenman, however, effectively ended the legal debate regarding its 
constitutionality.40 As the Ninth Circuit, facing one such challenge in 
                                                 
33 Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 447-50 (1884). See also U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cls. 2-3, 5. 
34 Julliard, 110 U.S. at 459-463 (Field, J., dissenting). 
35 Id. at 461-62. 
36 Id. at 462-63. 
37 Id. at 470. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 For additional background on the impact of Juilliard v. Greenman and 
related cases on the Supreme Court’s analysis of Congress’ constitutional 
powers, see generally Magliocca, supra note 26. See also Khan, supra note 
12, at 426-29. 
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1974, wistfully reflected, “[w]hile we agree that golden eagles, 
double eagles and silver dollars were lovely to look at and delightful 
to hold, we must at the same time recognize that time marches on.”41 
 The controversy over United States notes demonstrated that 
imbuing slips of green paper with legal tender status was difficult 
enough to comprehend, but further challenges lay ahead as the 
exchangeability of paper money for gold and silver eroded. Federal 
Reserve notes were essentially banknotes at the time of their creation 
in 1913—negotiable, redeemable for gold on demand and not a form 
of legal tender for private debts. However, following the enormous 
wave of bank failures in the 1930s, accompanied by substantial 
withdrawals of gold from the banking system, Congress acted to halt 
redemption and force acceptance of Federal Reserve notes as legal 
tender for all public and private debts.42 The President was 
authorized to prohibit export of gold; the U.S. Treasury was 
authorized to demand delivery of all gold coins, bullion and gold 
certificates in exchange for U.S. currency; and so-called “gold 
clauses,” creating obligations requiring payment in gold coin at a 
stated standard of weight and fineness, were declared dischargeable 
by payment in any legal tender.43 In a series of decisions that came to 
be known as the “gold clause cases,” the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
repayment of the face value of various obligations in depreciated 
                                                 
41 Milam v. United States, 524 F.2d 629, 630 (9th Cir. 1974, as amended 
1975) (rejecting Milam’s demand that a $50 Federal Reserve note be 
redeemed in gold or silver, citing Juilliard v. Greenman). See also United 
States v. Gardiner, 531 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1976) (rejecting the argument that 
no tax was owed because Federal Reserve notes received did not constitute 
lawful money, citing Milam); Leitch v. Dep’t of Revenue, 1982 Ore. Tax 
LEXIS 26 (Or. T.C. 1982) (rejecting argument that Federal Reserve notes 
must be converted to gold and silver before tax could be assessed, citing 
Juilliard v. Greenman); Leitch v. Dep’t of Revenue, 1994 Ore. Tax LEXIS 
32 (Or. T.C. 1994) (rejecting argument that assessed value of property 
should be reduced based on theory that paper money is unconstitutional, 
citing Juilliard v. Greenman); Radue v. Zanaty, 308 So. 2d 242 (Ala. 1975) 
(declaring “null and void” statements written on checks “to the effect that 
they were to be paid only in gold or silver coin,” citing Juilliard v. 
Greenman). 
42 See Khan, supra note 12, at 436-37. See also 31 U.S.C. §§ 5103 
(rendering Federal Reserve notes “legal tender for all debts”), 5118(b) 
(“The United States Government may not pay out any gold coin.”). 
43 See Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 291-97 (1935). 
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currency, including railroad bonds,44 U.S. gold bonds,45 and U.S. 
gold certificates.46 In a strongly worded dissent reminiscent of 
Field’s dissent in Juilliard v. Greenman, Justice McReynolds 
charged that, “under the guise of pursuing a monetary policy, 
Congress really has inaugurated a plan primarily designed to destroy 
obligations, repudiate national debts and drive into the Treasury all 
gold within the country, in exchange for inconvertible promises to 
pay, of much less value.”47 Observing that the government itself had 
realized billions in “counterfeit profits” through a “legislative fiat” 
based on “debasement of the dollar,” McReynolds—in a similarly 
ominous conclusion—warned that a “[l]oss of reputation for 
honorable dealing” would bring “unending humiliation.”48 
 No longer exchangeable for gold or silver, the supply of 
“money” would effectively become synonymous with the liabilities 
of the financial system, giving its definition “a somewhat arbitrary 
quality.”49 Today, economists define the money supply in various 
ways, including not only currency and bank deposits, but differing 
forms of “near money” as well—highly liquid “cash equivalents” 
such as money market fund shares and even government securities.50 
Meanwhile, the tangibility of money has greatly attenuated in an era 
of electronic transfers—to the point that physical money “accounts 
for just 11 per cent of the monetary measure known as M2,” the 
broader of the two measures used in the United States. Modern 
money—essentially a representation of the creditor-debtor relation-
ship—is fundamentally an expression of faith in the complex of 
mediating institutions that constitute the financial system.51 
                                                 
44 See generally id. 
45 See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
46 See Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935). 
47 See Perry, 294 U.S. at 369 (McReynolds issuing a single dissent in 
response to all of the “gold clause cases”). 
48 See id. at 381. 
49 See FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 52. 
50 See JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, BARRON’S DICTIONARY 
OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 426-27, 445 (6th ed. 2003). 
51 FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 30-31, 52-53, 343. See also Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, The Money Supply, http://www.newyorkfed.org/ 
aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed49.html; DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 50, at 
426-27; Khan, supra note 12, at 442. The Federal Reserve uses two 
measures of the money supply—M1 and M2. The former “is restricted to 
the most liquid forms of money; it consists of currency in the hands of the 
public; travelers checks; demand deposits, and other deposits against which 
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 Notwithstanding the United States’ effective abandonment of 
the gold standard in 1933,52 the status of the U.S. dollar would be 
bolstered—and its intrinsic nature would grow even more complex 
and abstract—due to the increasingly central position of the United 
States in a globalizing world. Just as individuals and firms use 
money to exchange, measure, and store value, so do nations. In the 
nineteenth century, the British pound sterling became what 
economists today call an “international currency”—a stable currency 
considered particularly attractive for international transactions, 
investment of government reserves and anchoring of less stable 
currencies (accomplished through currency pegs).53 The British 
pound’s position as an international currency was underwritten by 
gold convertibility, as well as the “hegemonic role of Victorian 
Britain as an enforcer of Pax Britannica and the position of the City 
of London . . . as the world’s clearing house.”54 By the 1940s, the 
economically and militarily dominant United States and the U.S. 
dollar had assumed this role through the post-war Bretton Woods 
system, which—following the dislocation of the interwar period—
prioritized price stability through fixed exchange rates based on 
dollars (nominally convertible into gold), and freedom to pursue 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies aimed at promoting 
domestic social stability.55 Given the system of fixed exchange rates, 
                                                                                                       
checks can be written.” See Federal Reserve Bank of New York, supra. The 
latter adds to these “savings accounts, time deposits of under $100,000, and 
balances in retail money market mutual funds.” Id. As of September 2010, 
M1 stood at $1.77 trillion, while the broader M2 stood at $8.71 trillion. See 
Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Statistical Release: Money Stock 
Measures, Oct. 14, 2010,  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/2010 
1014/ (seasonally adjusted figures). 
52 See supra note 42 and accompanying text; U.S. Dep’t of Treas., supra 
note 31; U.S. Dep’t of Treas., History of the Treasury, https://ustreas.gov/ 
education/history/events/1900-present.shtml. 
53 See Helleiner & Kirshner, supra note 11, at 3-7. 
54 ALAN DIGNAM & MICHAEL GALANIS, THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 94 (2009). 
55 Id. at 94-101. See also FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 306 (observing that, 
for purposes of the exchange-rate regime, “the dollar itself would notionally 
remain convertible into gold, vast quantities of which sat, immobile but 
totemic, in Fort Knox”). Note that while U.S. citizens lost the ability to 
convert currency into gold in 1933, “the Treasury would convert dollars into 
gold for foreign governments as a means of maintaining stability and 
394 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 30 
controls on the flow of money across borders were required to permit 
the pursuit of expansionary policies without “suffering the outflow of 
capital in search of a higher rate of interest or a lower rate of 
inflation.”56 
 The Bretton Woods system “was extremely successful in 
promoting stability and economic growth in the aftermath of [World 
War II],” but by the 1970s the increasing impracticability of 
controlling cross-border capital movements, coupled with a growing 
U.S. trade deficit, rendered it unsustainable.57 On August 15, 1971, 
the United States abandoned gold convertibility entirely, allowing its 
currency to float freely against other currencies. “From that day 
onward,” as Ferguson observes, “the centuries-old link between 
money and precious metal was broken.”58 
 As it turns out, severing that link did not diminish the 
dollar’s long-term global centrality, as a practical matter (explored 
below).59 It has arguably rendered the value of today’s dollar more 
difficult to comprehend, however, as a conceptual matter. 
 
III. The Value of a Dollar 
 
 The foregoing history, though cursory, permits refinement of 
the core question: What is the value of a dollar? Recall my 
grandfather’s silver certificates, with their express assurance that the 
holder could convert them into silver—literally true until June 24, 
                                                                                                       
confidence in the dollar.” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, FAQs: Gold 
& Silver, http://www.richmondfed.org/faqs/gold_silver/.  
56 RAWI ABDELAL, CAPITAL RULES 5, 44-47 (2007).  See also FERGUSON, 
supra note 11, at 59, 307 (explaining that a country cannot simultaneously 
pursue free capital movements, a fixed exchange rate, and autonomous 
monetary policy—the so-called “trilemma”).  For additional background, 
see generally John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, 
and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 
INT’L ORG. 379 (1982). 
57 See DIGNAM & GALANIS, supra note 54, at 99-101. 
58 FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 59. Note that where a country’s currency 
floats freely, its depreciation can help correct a trade deficit by raising the 
relative price of that country’s imports and decreasing the relative price of 
its exports. See RAJ BHALA, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
269-70 (2008).  
59 See, e.g., James, supra note 2, at 26-29; Jonathan Kirshner, After the 
(Relative) Fall: Dollar Diminution and the Consequences for American 
Power, in THE FUTURE OF THE DOLLAR, supra note 2, at 191, 204-207. 
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1968.60 As we have seen, the value of paper money convertible into 
metal is abstract enough. But contrast with this today’s dollar, 
offering no explanation of its value beyond the label “Federal 
Reserve Note” and the assertion of its adequacy as legal tender. 
 Is this the Great Khan’s money all over again? Yes and no. 
Federal Reserve notes are decidedly fiat money—by statute they 
most assuredly constitute “legal tender for all debts, public charges, 
taxes and dues.”61 As the Treasury explains, however, this merely 
renders it “a valid and legal offer of payment for debts when tendered 
to a creditor.” There being no federal law mandating their 
acceptance, “[p]rivate businesses are free to develop their own 
policies on whether or not to accept cash unless there is a State law 
which says otherwise.”62 
 The label “Federal Reserve Note” refers to the fact that our 
paper money is a creation of the Federal Reserve System—since 
1913, our central bank.63 Curiously, while federal law provides that 
Federal Reserve notes “shall be redeemed in lawful money on 
demand,”64 it is unclear what this “lawful money” could consist of 
(in the absence of gold or silver convertibility) aside from more 
Federal Reserve notes.65 Indeed, the U.S. Treasury confirms that 
“Federal Reserve notes are not redeemable in gold, silver, or any 
                                                 
60 See U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Buying, Selling & Redeeming, https://ustreas. 
gov/education/faq/currency/sales.shtml. 
61 See 31 U.S.C. § 5103. 
62 See U.S. Dep’t of Treas., supra note 31. “For example, a bus line may 
prohibit payment of fares in pennies or dollar bills.  In addition, movie 
theaters, convenience stores and gas stations may refuse to accept large 
denomination currency (usually notes above $20) as a matter of policy.” Id. 
Legal tender status effectively amounts to the same thing in England and 
Wales.  See Bank of England, Banknote Frequently Asked Questions, http:// 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/banknotes/about/faqs.htm (“Whether or not 
notes have legal tender status, their acceptability as a means of payment is 
essentially a matter for agreement between the parties involved.”). 
63 See Federal Reserve Board, The Structure of the Federal Reserve System, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/frseri.htm. 
64 See 12 U.S.C. § 411. 
65 See, e.g., Khan, supra note 12, at 439-41 (concluding that “lawful money 
for the redemption of Federal Reserve notes is non-existent”). The same is 
true of Bank of England notes, which—notwithstanding an express promise 
on the face of the note “to pay the bearer on demand” the given sum in 
pounds—“can only be exchanged for other Bank of England notes of the 
same face value.” See Bank of England, supra note 62. 
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other commodity, and receive no backing by anything.”66 The statute 
further provides, however, that these notes are “obligations of the 
United States.”67 To get them, a Federal Reserve Bank must set aside 
“collateral in amount equal to the sum of the Federal Reserve notes” 
requested,68 and, once issued, the notes “become a first and 
paramount lien on all the assets of such bank.”69 The point, according 
to the U.S. Treasury, is that “if the Congress dissolved the Federal 
Reserve System, the United States would take over the notes”—that 
is, assume the obligations they represent—but “would also take over 
the assets, which would be of equal value.” Federal Reserve Banks 
may acceptably set aside various forms of collateral, but according to 
the Treasury, most collateral in fact takes the form of “U.S. 
Government securities.”70 
 In the first instance, then, today’s dollar would seem to 
derive its value, as a legal matter, from its status as a liability of the 
Federal Reserve, which in turn derives value from a federal 
government guarantee. But whence the value of the federal 
government guarantee? To be sure, there would be collateral on 
hand, per federal law, if Congress ever saw fit to dissolve the Federal 
Reserve System—which it expressly reserved the right to do in the 
Federal Reserve Act.71 But the collateral backing these obligations of 
the United States would themselves, according to the Treasury, 
predominantly consist of obligations of the United States. In the 
government’s own hands, the collateral supporting the value of 
Federal Reserve notes would represent IOUs to itself—an accounting 
fiction.72 
                                                 
66 See U.S. Dep’t of Treas., supra note 31. 
67 See 12 U.S.C. § 411. 
68 See id. § 412.  
69 See id. § 414. 
70 U.S. Dep’t of Treas., supra note 31; U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Distribution of 
Currency and Coins, https://ustreas.gov/education/fact-sheets/currency/ 
distribution.shtml. See also 12 U.S.C. § 412 (providing that collateral may 
include, among other things, “any obligations which are direct obligations 
of, or are fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the United States 
or any agency thereof”). 
71 See Federal Reserve Act § 31 (omitted from U.S. Code) (“The right to 
amend, alter, or repeal this Act is hereby expressly reserved.”). 
72 Cf. Richard W. Stevenson, Baby Steps Toward Accord on Social Security, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1999, at 4 (describing the “accounting fiction” of 
withdrawing excess payroll taxes from the Social Security trust fund in 
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 Though perhaps difficult to imagine, this thought experiment 
does tend to suggest that the value of the U.S. government’s 
guarantee must ultimately derive from some source other than the 
“collateral” nominally supporting the issuance of Federal Reserve 
notes. Presumably its value must be underwritten by Congress’ 
fundamental constitutional power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts . . . of the United States.”73 To 
be sure, laying and collecting taxes in the form of Federal Reserve 
notes to support the value of Federal Reserve notes would seem 
pointlessly circular,74 though the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested 
that Congress possesses constitutional authority to tax in-kind75—
say, in the form of some valuable commodity. 
 To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that there is any 
realistic possibility of events actually unfolding in this manner in the 
foreseeable future. I trace the legal value of today’s dollar back to its 
apparent source to emphasize a reality that many will find uncomf-
ortable:  The dollar in your billfold essentially derives its value from 
you—more specifically, your productive capacity.76  
 Few Americans could be expected to explain the meta-
physics of modern money.77 But the notion that our currency is 
                                                                                                       
exchange for government securities—“nothing more than a promise to pay 
back the money”). 
73 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
74 See 12 U.S.C. § 411 (rendering Federal Reserve notes “receivable . . . for 
all taxes”). 
75 See Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 77-78 (1869) (upholding a state 
tax requiring payment “in gold and silver coin,” observing that the power to 
tax “is as complete in the States as the like power, within the limits of the 
Constitution, is complete in Congress”); Leonard & Leonard v. Earle, 279 
U.S. 392, 396-97 (1929) (upholding a state “privilege tax equal to 10% of 
the market value of the empty [oyster] shells resulting from [oyster 
packer’s] operations,” citing Lane County v. Oregon). See also Eduardo 
Moises Penalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182, 2208-11 
(2004).  For general discussion of the constitutional tension between 
taxation and takings doctrine, see generally Penalver, supra. 
76 Cf. U.S. Dep’t of Treas., supra note 31 (suggesting that “Federal Reserve 
notes are ‘backed’ by all the goods and services in the economy”). 
77 On the low rate of U.S. financial and economic literacy, see Dana 
Markow & Kelly Bagnaschi, What American Teens & Adults Know About 
Economics (Apr. 26, 2005); William B. Walstad & Max Larsen, Results 
From a National Survey of American Economic Literacy (Gallup 1992), 
http://www.amstat.org/sections/srms/Proceedings/papers/1993_211.pdf.  
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intrinsically a reflection of our own worth may nevertheless account 
for the great symbolic value of money. While commonly associated 
with material wealth and power in narrow instrumental terms,78 a 
moment’s glance at any currency demonstrates its simultaneous 
potency as a vehicle for national self-representation. 
 Consider the resonance of banknotes featuring great UK 
writers and thinkers—including Adam Smith, who appears on the 
£20 note with an illustration of the “division of labour in pin 
manufacturing” and “the great increase in the quantity of work that 
results.”79 The €20 note, interestingly, couples a map of Europe with 
an imaginary bridge—Benedict Anderson’s “imagined community” 
at work, symbolizing the bridging of disparate cultures and 
economies, to which the common currency itself is expected to 
contribute.80 The Canadian $5 bill, appropriately enough, depicts 
outdoor hockey—itself a unifying symbol of national culture in a 
diverse and geographically far-flung country.81 
 Contrast with these our own drab Federal Reserve notes, 
which depict (in the words of the U.S. Treasury Bureau of Engraving 
and Printing) “portraits of famous, deceased American statesmen.” 
This may tend to suggest a preoccupation with leadership and 
strength—though the inscription “In God We Trust” perhaps conveys 
simultaneous misgivings about our ability to pull it off alone.82 
                                                 
78 See, e.g., FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 1 (observing this tendency). 
79 See Bank of England, Current Banknotes, http://www.bankofengland. 
co.uk/banknotes/current/index.htm. 
80 See European Central Bank, Banknotes, http://www.ecb.int/euro/ 
banknotes/html/index.en.html. For Anderson’s theory of national identity, 
see BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (rev. 1991). 
81 See Bank of Canada, Bank note series, 1935 to present: $5 (upgraded), 
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/banknotes/general/character/2001-04_05b. 
html. The inscription, a quote from Canadian novelist Roch Carrier 
(presented both in English and in French), reads: “The winters of my 
childhood were long, long seasons. We lived in three places—the school, 
the church and the skating rink—but our real life was on the skating rink.”   
82 See Bureau of Engraving and Printing, U.S. Currency Small Denomi-
nations, http://www.moneyfactory.com/uscurrency/smalldenominations. 
html. The inscription was proposed in 1863 by Salmon P. Chase, Secretary 
of the Treasury, as a reflection of “increased religious sentiment existing 
during the Civil War.” Since 1938, all U.S. coins have included this 
inscription, which in 1956 was declared the national motto. It first appeared 
on paper money on the reverse of 1957 one-dollar silver certificates 
(including my grandfather’s). See U.S. Dep’t of Treas., History of “In God 
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IV. The Mirror of Money 
 
 Given the apparent circularity of the dollar’s legal value, we 
might characterize the matter another way. Perhaps the dollar’s 
practical value is a function of public faith in the quality of U.S. 
policy—reflected most directly in the ability to sell the U.S. 
government securities serving as nominal “collateral.” After all, the 
bond market “passes a daily judgment on the credibility of every 
government’s fiscal and monetary policies” through “its ability to 
punish a government with higher borrowing costs.”83 
 Indeed, the role of market perception becomes clearest in 
times of crisis, which reveal the deeper psychology of the public’s 
relationship with its money.  Perhaps it is the very potency of money 
as a vehicle for symbols of national pride that renders a currency’s 
decline so viscerally painful, even shameful.84 Sociologist Elias 
Canetti famously characterized hyperinflation—a steep fall in the 
purchasing power of money—as a reflection of collective 
psychology, a “crowd phenomenon,” in which a currency “suddenly 
loses its identity.” He remarks of his own experience of hyper-
inflation that 
 
[w]hat used to be one Mark is first called 10,000, 
then 100,000, then a million. . . . It is no longer like a 
person; it has no continuity and it has less and less 
value. A man who has been accustomed to rely on it 
cannot help feeling its degradation as his own. He 
has identified himself with it for too long and his 
                                                                                                       
We Trust,” https://ustreas.gov/education/fact-sheets/currency/in-god-we-
trust.shtml. See also 31 U.S.C. §§ 5112(d)(1), 5114(b); Newdow v. Lefevre, 
598 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2010) (reaffirming that printing “In God We Trust” 
on currency does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). 
83 FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 69.  See also Christopher M. Bruner, States, 
Markets, and Gatekeepers: Public-Private Regulatory Regimes in an Era of 
Economic Globalization, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 125 (2008); Christopher M. 
Bruner & Rawi Abdelal, To Judge Leviathan: Sovereign Credit Ratings, 
National Law, and the World Economy, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y 191 (2005). 
84 Cf. Belinda Goldsmith, Money means more to people since financial 
crisis: poll, REUTERS, Feb. 22, 2010, http://uk.reuters.com/article/ 
idUKTRE61L2FK20100222. 
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confidence in it has been like his confidence in 
himself.85 
 
 Though worlds away from such extremes, similar 
undercurrents are detectable in post-crisis American popular culture. 
The satirical newspaper The Onion describes an “existential” 
breakdown by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke who, while 
reporting to the Senate Finance Committee, comes to the sudden 
recognition that “money is, in fact, just a meaningless and intangible 
social construct.” News of the revelation that “money is nothing 
more than an elaborate head game” spreads across the country, 
leaving citizens marveling at “the little green drawings of buildings 
and dead white men they once used to measure their adequacy and 
importance as human beings.”86 
 Like all good satire, this magnifies something real—the 
growing sense of unreality associated with our financial system and 
our money. While the intricacies of the recent crisis lie beyond the 
scope of this essay, the upshot is that our banking system’s flair for 
expanding credit defeated itself soundly. Securitization—which 
involves pooling debt (e.g. residential mortgages) and then selling it 
to investors, freeing up money for new loans—spun well out of 
control due to the proliferation of investment structures of 
unmanageable complexity, obscuring the risks and encouraging weak 
lending standards to sustain the process.87 The resulting growth in 
personal indebtedness and build-up of risk in the financial system 
were matched and reinforced by growth of public indebtedness, as 
East Asian exporters and oil-rich nations continued to lend their 
substantial trade surpluses back to us by buying U.S. Treasury 
securities—a “recycling” process thought to have reduced interest 
                                                 
85 ELIAS CANETTI, CROWDS AND POWER 183-86 (Carol Stewart trans., 
Noonday Press 1998) (1960). See also JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE  235-40 (1920).  
86 U.S. Economy Grinds to Halt as Nation Realizes Money Just a Symbolic, 
Mutually Shared Illusion, ONION, Feb. 16, 2010, http://www.theonion.com/ 
articles/us-economy-grinds-to-halt-as-nation-realizes-money,2912/. 
87 See generally Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a 
Time of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2010), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1617890; ROBERT POZEN, TOO BIG TO SAVE? (2010). 
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rates on long-term Treasuries, fueling investor demand for higher-
yield mortgage-backed securities.88 
 Adam Smith, while recognizing that “judicious” banking 
could expand the nation’s productive capital, also warned that 
“commerce and industry . . . cannot be altogether so secure, when . . . 
suspended upon the Daedalian wings of paper money.”89 The same 
might be said of our further expansion of credit, suspended upon the 
Daedalian wings of securitized debt. Our use of securitization has 
been anything but “judicious,” and the heights to which it carried us 
only left us further to fall. 
 Our enormous public debt, however, reflects a longer-term 
and more fundamental problem.90 Over the last few decades the 
United States has moved from net creditor to net debtor, accounting 
for about three-quarters of global capital imports by 2000.91 Our 
global trade deficit grew from $329 billion in 1999 to $816 billion in 
2008, and as of March 2010, the total U.S. public debt stood at $12.5 
trillion—$8 trillion of which was held by the public, including $1.9 
trillion held by China, Japan and various oil exporters.92 Continuing 
bailouts, stabilization efforts and rising Social Security and Medicare 
obligations will make matters considerably worse, creating enormous 
                                                 
88 See Bruner, supra note 87, at 5-7; POZEN, supra note 87, at 7-12; Francis 
E. Warnock & Veronica Cacdac Warnock, International Capital Flows and 
U.S. Interest Rates (FRB International Finance Discussion Paper No. 840, 
2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=813044. 
89 SMITH, supra note 9, ¶ II.2.86. 
90 See, e.g., Sewell Chan, Bernanke Warns of “Unsustainable” Debt, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/business/ 
economy/10fed.html; Chuck Marr, Letting High-Income Tax Cuts Expire Is 
Proper Response to Nation’s Short- and Long-Term Challenges (Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities, July 26, 2010); Editorial, A Real Debate on 
Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/24/ 
opinion/24tue1.html.                                                                                                                                                      
91 See James, supra note 2, at 32-34. See also Luke Burgess, The Role of the 
U.S. Dollar as Reserve Currency: Is the Dollar in Danger?, 
GOLDWORLD.COM, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.goldworld.com/articles/us+ 
dollar-reserve-currency/359. 
92 See U.S. Census Bureau, Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports and Trade 
Balance) with World, Seasonally Adjusted, http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balancec0004.html; TreasuryDirect, The Debt to the Penny and Who 
Holds It, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/BPDLogin?application=np; 
U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, 
http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt. 
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challenges for U.S. policymakers.93 We could gamble that surplus-
generating governments will continue to finance our deficits, and 
hope that U.S. households sobered by the crisis might save more, but 
neither can be taken for granted.94 
 The dollar’s future depends critically on how attractive 
global market actors and governments find the dollar moving 
forward. The core U.S. advantage is a high degree of security and 
stability, underwritten by a predictable, functional legal system and 
deep, liquid markets. Our regulatory and market institutions have 
clearly taken a battering, yet the dollar remains relatively stable (at 
this writing) for two reasons. First, China and other exporters are 
locked in because they already hold so much. They may advocate re-
denominating dollar-based markets (notably oil) and seek alternative 
reserve currencies, but their enormous dollar holdings strongly 
disincentive rocking the boat too vigorously.95 Second, while 
concerns regarding U.S. deficits may eventually undermine the 
dollar’s status—undercutting our ability to fund deficit spending 
through overseas borrowing—this assumes the existence of some 
better alternative. Given the euro’s woes following the Greek debt 
debacle—revealing the inability of European institutions to deal 
effectively with crises—the U.S. dollar retains its relative luster for 
the time being.96 
                                                 
93 See David P. Calleo, Twenty-First Century Geopolitics and the Erosion of 
the Dollar Order, in THE FUTURE OF THE DOLLAR, supra note 2, at 164, 
180-81; Shahien Nasiripour, Elizabeth Warren Warns About Commercial 
Real Estate Crisis, ‘Downward Spiral’ For Small Businesses, Local Banks, 
HUFFINGTONPOST.COM, Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2010/02/11/commercial-real-estate-wa_n_458092.html; Nelson D. 
Schwartz, Corporate Debt Coming Due May Squeeze Credit, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/business/16debt.html. 
See also supra note 90.  
94 See FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 362; POZEN, supra note 87, at 327-30.  
95 See James, supra note 2, at 31, 35; Batson, supra note 7; Keith Bradsher, 
Europe’s Debt Woes Start to Complicate China’s Money Moves, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/business/ 
30yuan.html; Fisk, supra note 7; POZEN, supra note 87, at 329-30; Ydstie, 
supra note 7. 
96 See, e.g., Bradsher, supra note 95; Benjamin J. Cohen, Toward a 
Leaderless Currency System, in THE FUTURE OF THE DOLLAR, supra note 2, 
at 142, 147-52; James, supra note 2, at 28-29; Kirshner, supra note 59, at 
194-95; Ronald McKinnon, U.S. Current Account Deficits and the Dollar 
Standard’s Sustainability: A Monetary Approach, in THE FUTURE OF THE 
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 The critical point, however, is that failure to address our 
deficits will leave the dollar’s future entirely in the hands of others. 
As noted above, there have been bad signs in the market, including 
reported threats of sovereign downgrade and volatility in credit 
default swaps on U.S. Treasuries. Outright default is not the issue, of 
course, given our extraordinary ability to borrow in our own 
currency. The real risk lies in turning on the printing presses, leading 
to inflation. As Robert Pozen observes, “due to its involvement in the 
bailout program, the Federal Reserve has increased the size of its 
balance sheet from $850 billion in mid-2007 to over $2 trillion in 
mid-2009, and has decreased its holdings of U.S. Treasuries from 90 
percent to 30 percent of its portfolio.” This deterioration, Pozen 
suggests, could undermine the Federal Reserve’s independence and 
capacity to take politically unpopular actions to fight inflation (i.e. 
raising interest rates).97 Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner insists 
that the United States is “deeply serious” about tackling deficits, 
touting a new bipartisan “fiscal responsibility” commission, but the 
prospects remain bleak.98 
                                                                                                       
DOLLAR, supra note 2, at 45, 65; Eric Helleiner, Enduring Top Currency, 
Fragile Negotiated Currency: Politics and the Dollar’s International Role, 
in THE FUTURE OF THE DOLLAR, supra note 2, at 69, 73-75; POZEN, supra 
note 87, at 330-31; Herman Schwartz, Housing Finance, Growth, and the 
U.S. Dollar’s Surprising Durability, in THE FUTURE OF THE DOLLAR, supra 
note 2, at 88, 90-91, 114-15; Daniel Whitten, Zoellick Says U.S. Dollar’s 
Primacy Not a Certainty, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 27, 2009, http://www. 
bloomberg.com/apps/news? pid=20601087&sid=aINN4BM6Fy5w; Ydstie, 
supra note 7.  On the practical challenges of returning to a gold standard, 
see Alan Greenspan, Can the U.S. Return to a Gold Standard?, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 1, 1981, at 30. 
97 POZEN, supra note 87, at 332-34. See also Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song 
Shin, The Changing Nature of Financial Intermediation and the Financial 
Crisis of 2007-09 22-27 (FRB Staff Report no. 439, Apr. 2010); McKinnon, 
supra note 96, at 48-50. 
98 See Judith Burns, Geithner Defends U.S. Bond Rating, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
8, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487034277045750 
51544279868172.html; Peggy Noonan, Can Washington Meet the Demand 
to Cut Spending?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424052748703315004575073793778656392.html; Press 
Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama 
Establishes Bipartisan National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and 
Reform (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 
president-obama-establishes-bipartisan-national-commission-fiscal-
responsibility-an.  
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 Meanwhile, doubts regarding the Federal Reserve’s capacity 
to combat weaknesses in the economy by printing more money—
coupled with fears that its efforts to do so may further hinder its 
ability to fight inflation in the long-run—have fueled a flight back to 
gold and silver, while threatening to undermine the credibility of the 
Federal Reserve System and the U.S. dollar alike.99 Onion-esque 
references to further infusions of “funny money”100 and “cyber-
cash”101 into the financial system (through sustained low interest 
rates and purchases of Treasury securities and mortgage-related 
“assets”—so-called “quantitative easing”) reflect a growing sense 
that our monetary system is eroding as the Federal Reserve flounders 
in search of a response to problems that are in fact far more 
fundamental than the availability of further credit. These include, 
among other things, our massive existing debt, our “bloated 
consumer economy,” and lower costs of production elsewhere.102 
                                                 
99 See supra note 4. See also Paul R. La Monica, The Fed’s gold problem, 
CNNMONEY.COM, Sept. 19, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/2010/09/16/ 
news/economy/thebuzz/index.htm.  On the Fed’s commitment to very low 
interest rates and increasing the money supply as a means of spurring 
economic recovery, see Sewell Chan, Fed Move on Debt Signals Concern 
About Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/08/11/business/economy/11fed.html; Sewell Chan, Federal Reserve 
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While I have suggested here that our debt presents enormous 
long-term challenges, it bears emphasizing that one could quite 
rationally favor fiscal stimulus, on the one hand, without favoring 
monetary stimulus, on the other. As Nobel Prize-winning economist 
Paul Krugman has observed, “fiscal expansion [is] relatively certain 
in its effect: if the government goes and buys a trillion dollars’ worth 
of stuff, that will create a lot of jobs. On the other hand, if the Fed 
goes out and buys a trillion[] dollars’ worth of long-term bonds”—
increasing the money supply through quantitative easing—“the effect 
is quite uncertain, with many possible slips between the cup and the 
lip.”103 He elaborates, “[t]he truth is that it’s very hard for central 
banks to get traction in a zero-rate world,” as “nobody is sure how 
much effect quantitative easing will have on long-term rates.”104 In 
the meantime, as another observer adds, while the ultimate 
consequences of quantitative easing remain “difficult to predict,” it is 
“no surprise that many investors are now taking refuge in tangible 
assets”—notably gold and silver, which, as markets have long 
understood, “governments can’t debase by printing more of.”105 
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V. Conclusion 
 
 The dynamics explored above reveal the dollar’s value to be 
a function of our own merits. Ferguson aptly characterizes money as 
“the mirror of mankind,” reflecting “the way we value ourselves and 
the resources of the world around us.”106 But our own mirror has 
been fogged by the dollar’s role as reserve currency and our 
unflagging capacity to obscure financial risks—a tendency reflected 
not only in the securitization structures precipitating the crisis, but 
also in the abuse of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet that has 
followed. Our key challenge, then, will be mustering the self-
awareness and discipline to discern our own warts in an imperfect 
mirror. 
 A dollar bill ought to prompt the question, “how good a 
credit are we?” Perhaps the way forward is to harness the great 
symbolic value of the dollar itself—say, by issuing a new series of 
bills with a mirror on the front and the National Debt Clock on the 
back.107 Given other pressing matters, I suspect this will not make the 
congressional agenda anytime soon. In the meantime, only the 
mind’s eye will allow us to see the dollar and ourselves for what we 
truly are. 
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107 On the debt clock, see Clyde Haberman, Debt Alarm Ringing? Hit 
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